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ABSTRACT
By emphasizing concepts such as resilience and local ownership, recent updates in
the EU’s foreign policy strategy have marked a narrative turn and signaled a shift
in EU external governance toward its neighborhood. This article has two
aims. First, we unpack the EU’s conceptual understanding of resilience and
local ownership as reflected in its recent strategic documents. Second, we
examine the implications of the EU’s narrative turn on actual policy practices
in Eastern Partnership countries. We highlight a gap between the EU’s
broad understanding of resilience and local ownership and the narrow
operationalization of these concepts in the EU’s eastern policy. The article shows
that the EU continued relying on the previously established policy frameworks,
according to which resilience develops through approximation with EU
templates. This strong path dependence precluded any effective policy turn
toward local ownership.
KEYWORDS Resilience; local ownership; European Union; EU foreign policy; Eastern Partnership
The revision of the European Union (EU) foreign policy in 2015–2016 has
resulted in a major narrative turn toward resilience and local ownership.1
Whereas both concepts have, for over a decade, been advanced in development
and peacebuilding policies (see, e.g., European Commission, 2012), they have
gradually made their way to other external policies of the EU and became the
central points of the European foreign policy as outlined by European Union
Global Strategy (EUGS) (High Representative, 2016; Tocci, 2020; Korosteleva
& Flockhart, 2020). This turn can arguably be explained by the need for a
more efficient use of resources and more effective and adaptable policies in the
context of multiple crises and growing uncertainty challenging the EU both
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internally and externally (Davis Cross, 2016; Tocci, 2017). The EU’s discursive
shift therefore mirrors “a middle ground between over-ambitious liberal
peacebuilding and under-ambitious stability” (Wagner & Anholt, 2016, p. 414).
The “spill-over” of the concepts of resilience and local ownership from the
security and humanitarian domains to other EU external policies deserves
further scrutiny. This is because other external policies unfold in less fragile
environments and imply less asymmetric relations between international
and domestic actors, compared, for instance, to humanitarian crises. Such a
different context may have implications for the meaning attached to resilience
and local ownership. More equal relations between international and dom-
estic actors may also be conducive to both greater local ownership and an
easier application of this policy principle in practice.
In light of the EU’s “special relationship” with its neighbors (Treaty on the
European Union: article 8) and the role envisaged for resilience and local own-
ership in the recent EuropeanNeighborhood Policy (ENP) revision, the ENP is
fertile ground to both unpack the EU’s understanding of resilience and local
ownership, and test whether these notions yield policy change outside the
humanitarian and peacebuilding contexts. Indeed, as argued by Smith, “if the
EU cannot effectively build resilience, stability, and cooperation with its own
close neighbors, its internal legitimacy and its credibility as a strategic actor
elsewhere could be undermined” (Smith, 2016; see also Korosteleva, 2018).
Focusing on the eastern dimension of the ENP, where the EU has developed
a highly ambitious cooperation agenda, we ask how the EU conceptualizes the
resilience–local ownership nexus in the relationship with its neighbors and
whether the narrative turn translates into change of practices in the Eastern
Partnership (EaP). By answering these research questions, we aim to contrib-
ute to the literature by (i) exploring further the nexus between resilience and
local ownership as reflected in EU policies, (ii) investigating how the principles
of resilience and local ownership translate from policy formulation to policy
implementation, and (iii) empirically tracing and explaining recent trends in
the EU foreign policy towards neighborhood. Thus our research sits on two
bodies of literature—the analysis of EU external action in the neighborhood
and the security/humanitarian aid literature on resilience and local ownership.
Drawing on the insights from both strands, our article aims to bridge the gap
between these literatures which rarely speak to each other.
Our research is carried out in two steps. First we conduct a discourse analy-
sis of 30 EU official documents in order to illuminate the meaning attached by
the EU to resilience and local ownership in the EaP context. In particular, we
look at how both notions are defined, what the scope of action is, what mech-
anisms are envisaged for policy implementation and what actors are identified
in the EU documents. In total, nine multilateral and 21 country-specific docu-
ments are analyzed. For each of these sets we selected key documents, e.g.,
EUGS and Strategic approach to resilience, ENP policy reviews, as well as
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European Neighborhood Instrument (ENI) single support frameworks, Com-
mission implementing decisions, and Association implementation reports.
While the study is based on the analysis of all sources, only some of them
are quoted in the article for illustrative purposes.
Second, we analyze EU policies as part of the EaP, with a focus on three
issue areas: trade and economic development, mobility, and governance
and the rule of law. These three sectors were selected because they constitute
priority areas of the EU cooperation with the EaP states (EEAS, 2018) and
provide a good mix of “high” and “low” politics issues. As such, they are at
the heart of both the bilateral and multilateral tracks of the EaP. In our analy-
sis, we focus on the bilateral track, which was designed as the core instrument
to “create a closer relationship” between the EU and each country (European
Commission, 2008, p. 3) and therefore was developed as the backbone of the
EaP. Even though we cover all six EaP countries, we pay specific attention to
Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine because the EU has deployed a more compre-
hensive array of policy instruments for these countries. Our comparison
between the EU’s discourse and practices highlights a disconnect between
the EU’s narrative shift toward a hybrid approach to the resilience–local own-
ership thinking and the continuation of top-down practices inherited from
the modernization approach in the EaP.
The article starts by an overview of the major conceptual approaches
underpinning the meaning of resilience and local ownership, which remain
highly contested in the literature. We then investigate the EU’s conceptualiz-
ation of resilience and local ownership and seek to locate the EU’s under-
standing of these concepts along the continuum of theoretical approaches.
The article proceeds with an analysis of how these concepts are operationa-
lized in the EU’s Eastern Partnership, drawing upon three short case
studies. Finally, we compare the insights from the three case studies and
explain why the narrative turn failed to trigger policy change.
Conceptual perspectives on resilience and local ownership: A
theoretical continuum
As discussed by Korosteleva & Flockhart (2020), resilience and local ownership
are ambiguous concepts. This article suggests looking at the conceptualizations
of resilience and local ownership as a continuum ranging from modernization
theory to post-liberal approach. This continuum reflects different accounts of
interrelations between the “local” and the “global,” which are analyzed here
based on the rights and responsibilities assigned to the internal and external
actors. More precisely, we look into different approaches to actors, scope, and
mechanisms of cooperation (Table 1). Actors are understood as the participants
of international cooperation. Scope refers to the extent of the subject matter
which is seen as relevant for resilience-building. It includes issue areas and
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institutions involved in cooperation. Mechanisms imply established social pro-
cesses allowing an actor to achieve the desired outcomes. In what follows, we
present the continuum of theoretical approaches and outline their framing of
resilience and local ownership.
At one extreme, resilience and local ownership can be seen through the lens
of the mоdernization theory and transition paradigm (Goorha, 2010; Paris,
2010) (also labeled as “liberal peace” approach in peacebuilding studies),
which presume the universality оf nоrms and development paths. In this
paradigm resilience-building suggests the reform of domestic structures fol-
lowing Western templates to increase their viability, whereas local ownership
entails the responsibility of domestic actors to implement externally devel-
oped policies. In terms of actors, the modernization theory tends to focus
on state structures (Paris, 2010, p. 349) and international non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) (Selby, 2013, p. 62). Importantly, domestic agency is
mainly expected during policy implementation and is limited at other
stages of the policy process. The scope of resilience-building is therefore
rather narrow and concentrates on a liberal reform agenda. The mechanisms
of resilience-building and local ownership in the modernization theory are
essentially top-down (Zaum, 2012, pp. 121–122). Resilience-building is
carried out through the provision by external actors of ready-made policy
templates and resources (financial aid, expertise) to “the local” (see also
Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p. 774). This vision of resilience-based govern-
ance and local ownership is often interpreted by the proponents of critical
Table 1. Conceptual perspectives on resilience and local ownership.
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theory as a form of neoliberal governmentality, that is a mode of governance
from a distance aimed at “disciplining of states, governments and elites”
(Joseph, 2013, p. 51) concealed by a rhetoric of empowerment (Richmond,
2012; see also Duffield, 2001, 2007; Sabaratnam, 2013).
At the other end of the continuum, the communitarian approach (Brown,
1992; Bell, 2016) emphasizes the uniqueness of lоcal structures and “rather
than relying on a universal template… stress that any viable solution to the
problems of order and good governance must ‘derive from, and resonate
with the habits and traditions of actual people living in specific times and
places’” (Bell 2009 as cited in Donais, 2012, p. 5). In this paradigm, resili-
ence-building must draw on local structures even if they dо nоt fit the
Wеstern vоcabulary, and local ownership implies the predominance of dom-
estic actors in the formulation and implementation of cooperation projects.
Thus the primary role in this perspective belongs to local communities.
This suggests an “inside-out” logic of interaction (Korosteleva, 2020), where
cooperation with external actors should be premised on local preferences
and resources (Bush, 1996). The locals are regarded as primary actors at all
stages of international cooperation. They are to define problems and
develop policies, and policy implementation should rely upon local resources
(Nathan 2007). Conversely, the involvement of external actors is defined by
the local community. Hence, the communitarian perspective implies a
broad and open scope of local ownership, which applies to all policy areas
and the whole society of the target state.
Finally, in terms of mechanisms, the communitarian perspective is essen-
tially a bottom-up approach largely relying on self-governance. Cooperation
with external actors requires a flexible tailor-made and context-sensitive fra-
mework designed to the needs of the local actors as articulated by them. A step
further brings this standpoint to the extreme of the post-liberal approach,
which, in line complexity theory, contends that systems are characterized
by self-organization. Hence, external intervention or efforts of resilience-
building from outside “corrupt” local institutions and destabilize societal
self-оrganization (Chandler, 2014).2
Whereas the modernization theory still often guides international
cooperation, two decades of critique developed by the proponents of commu-
nitarian approach has resulted in some fusion of these approaches in practice.
Mac Ginty referred to this fusion as hybridity or hybrid peace (Mac Ginty,
2010). He suggested moving away from binary thinking and defined hybridity
as “composite forms of practice, norms and thinking that emerge from the
interaction of different groups, worldviews and activity. It is not the grafting
together of two separate entities to produce a third entity… it is a much more
complex process” (Mac Ginty & Sanghera, 2012, p. 3). Hence, as an analytical
perspective, hybridity lies in-between the modernization theory and the com-
munitarian approach.
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Seen as an analytical tool, a process and an outcome, hybridity has also been
framed by some scholars as “desirable political project that could stimulate
alternatives and counter what is perceived to be hegemonic externally driven
liberal programming” (Peterson, 2012, p. 10). For instance, Donais (2012)
argues that this paradigm entails that cooperation projects should be the
subject of broad negotiation and cоntestation. Opening the political process is
expected to eventually lead to “a stable, long-term consensus” (p. 143)
between international and local stakeholders, which should build the foundation
for sustainable local ownership and resilience-building embedded in local struc-
tures. As such, in terms of actors the hybrid approach implies the involvement of
the state, communities and society at large. Agency is exercised by both internal
and external actors at all stages of cooperation, which results in a wide scope of
resilience and local ownership. In terms of cooperation mechanisms, the hybrid
approach is characterized by a combination of top-down and bottom-up logics
(Mac Ginty, 2010), as well as tailor-made cooperation frameworks, rather than
the application of a single cooperation template. Donais maintains that a hybrid
perspective implies negotiation and re-negotiation processes that might lead to
consensus-building and hence improved policy outcomes.
The conceptualization of resilience and local ownership also generates
major implications for their interplay. Whereas in the modernization
theory local ownership is confined to channeling externally driven resili-
ence-building policies, in communitarian approaches it de facto precludes
any attempts to introduce resilience from the outside (Leonardsson &
Rudd, 2015). In a liberal perspective, both notions are tightly intertwined in
practice. Therefore, the articulation between resilience and local ownership
can reflect patterns of subordination, cooperation or exclusion, thereby yield-
ing different policy practices.
Resilience and local ownership: The EU’s conceptualization in
the Eastern Partnership
The EU’s conceptualization of resilience and local ownership in the EaP has
been deeply influenced by the EU’s narrative turn reflected in the revision of
EU foreign policy in 2015–2016. In this section, we do not delve into either the
substance or the drivers of the EU’s discursive shift, as these elements have
been abundantly analyzed elsewhere (Mälksoo, 2016; Juncos, 2017; Tocci,
2020). Building on these studies, we rather seek to explain the implications
of this narrative turn for the EaP.
The EU’s conceptualization of resilience
The European Commission’s strategic approach to resilience highlights a
strong interconnection with local ownership. Resilience is not regarded as
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an end goal, but rather as a means to attain a country’s national development
goals, to achieve security, to build inclusive societies or to recover from shocks
(European Commission, 2017a).
However, perhaps paradoxically, resilience-building in the EU’s neighbor-
hood is primarily justified by the EU’s own security:
it is in the interests of our citizens to invest in the resilience of states and
societies to the east stretching into Central Asia, and south down to Central
Africa. Fragility beyond our borders threatens all our vital interests. By contrast,
resilience… benefits us and countries in our surrounding regions, sowing
the seeds for sustainable growth and vibrant societies. (High Representative,
2016. p. 23)
Such a rationale certainly echoes the primary objective of the ENP itself,
namely the creation of to a “ring of friends” around the EU’s borders
(Council of the European Union, 2003), but it contradicts both the under-
standing of resilience as a concept of uncertainty and the vision of resilience
as a locally grown capacity.3
In terms of agency, the EU sets a focus on two types of actors—states and
societies—which coincide with the top-down and bottom-up logics of
cooperation respectively. Whereas state resilience is perceived as a priority,
it is argued that agency needs to be expanded from state to the entire society:
to ensure sustainable security, it is not only state institutions that we will
support… resilience is a broader concept, encompassing all individuals and
the whole of society. A resilient society featuring democracy, trust in insti-
tutions, and sustainable development lies at the heart of a resilient state.
(High Representative, 2016, pp. 23–24)
The list of issue areas to be addressed in the context of resilience-building in the
neighborhood is broad and includes democracy as well as economic, climate,
energy, environmental, and migration policy resilience (High Representative,
2016, p. 9). In terms of sectoral resilience, EU mechanisms include increased
cooperation, extension of the EU’s institutions and agencies to the neighbor-
hood, capacity-building, and a range of financial assistance mechanisms.
Thus the toolbox of resilience-building is coherent with the previous approach
of external governance characterized by the extension of the EU’s legislation
and institutions beyond its borders without granting access to the decision-
making process (Lavenex, 2004). Yet, in the sphere of democracy promotion,
the EU’s strategy demonstrates a combination of continuity with the previously
established mechanisms and novel approaches. In essence, it largely draws on
the EU’s normative and soft power—“power of attraction can spur transform-
ation” (High Representative, 2016, p. 9), as well as diffusion and spill-over
effects. It is anticipated that the “success stories,” such as Tunisia and
Georgia who are said to have established “prosperous, stable and peaceful
democracies…would reverberate actors their respective regions” (High
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Representative, 2016, p. 25). However, an important innovation is the emphasis
placed on broader societal engagement for the emergence of sustainable resili-
ence. The EUGS specifically refers to people-to-people contacts and the need
for increased connections with “cultural organisations, religious communities,
social partners and human rights defenders” (High Representative, 2016,
p. 25). It thus goes beyond the mere emphasis on NGOs introduced in the
2011 ENP revision.
The EU’s conceptualization of local ownership
Next to resilience, local ownership is the most prominent novelty of the 2015–
2016 policy revision. While this principle had already been occasionally men-
tioned in EU official documents since 2004, the ENP revision of 2015 sought
to establish an ambitious and innovative approach in the EU’s cooperation
with the neighborhood by placing local ownership at its core. The ENP
review plays down the EU’s own experience and acknowledges that “not all
partners aspire to EU rules and standards” (European Commission & High
Representative, 2015, p. 2). This new approach is expected to result in new
patterns of relations based on greater policy ownership from the partners.
The rationale behind this paradigm shift is explained by a range of factors.
The ENP revision directly points to the fact that it is a demand-driven change:
“the consultation has further indicated that ownership by both partners and
EU Member States needs to be stepped up” (European Commission &
High Representative, 2015, p. 3).4 Furthermore, it is expected that greater
local ownership will provide more legitimacy and resonance to EU-driven
domestic reforms (Ejdus, 2017; Mahr, 2018) and will allow to avoid the per-
ception of an imposition of the EU’s agenda (European Commission, 2004).
Therefore, genuine local ownership is predicated to contribute to greater
policy effectiveness and sustainability.
Similarly to resilience-building, the EU identifies state and societies as key
actors to foster local ownership. The 2015–2016 narrative turn resulted in
specific mechanisms being designed for ensuring ownership on both levels.
At state level, the strategy puts forward regular consultations with the
partner countries with the objective to incorporate their priorities in the
ENP. Such consultations may result in “the possibility to jointly set new part-
nership priorities, which would focus each relationship more clearly on
commonly identified shared interests” (European Commission & High Repre-
sentative, 2015, p. 4). In other words, the new EU strategy envisages common
agenda-setting and policy formulation for bilateral and multilateral
cooperation in the EaP. Regarding policy implementation, a better fit of the
cooperation agenda to local practices and resources is encouraged. Finally,
in terms of policy evaluation, the EU made another step towards ensuring
greater local ownership by rejecting the practice of preparing one set of
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progress reports based on a single template. A new system of progress reports
has already been introduced, which considers the timing and cooperation pri-
orities with every single partner. Thus the EU’s EaP policy-making reflects
greater differentiation among, and therefore ownership by eastern neighbors.
Next to the new practices foreseen for each stage of the foreign policy cycle,
the EU also introduced innovative mechanisms in order to guarantee greater
societal policy ownership. This includes not only the practice of public
consultations but also the intention to both engage the representatives
of different societal groups and go beyond traditional, yet limited, NGO-
focus—“in many neighbourhood countries ethnic, religious and cultural iden-
tities and traditions play a crucial role in the way society functions. During the
public consultation, stakeholders referred to these factors and asked the EU to
allow more co-ownership” (European Commission & High Representative,
2015, pp. 6–7). Besides consultations, the EU claims that “sub-national,
national and intra-regional civil society” (European Commission & High
Representative, 2015, p. 6) will be engaged through both financial assistance
and intensified cooperation. These measures are expected to sustainably
increase the sense of policy ownership among the societies of the Eastern Part-
nership states.
Hence, our analysis highlights the intrinsic connection between resilience
and local ownership in the EU’s strategic thinking. The new resilience strategy
(European Commission, 2017a) stresses the adaptability of domestic struc-
tures and emphasizes the shift of responsibility from the EU to its partners,
thus implicating greater local ownership. The argument that “positive
change can only be home-grown” (High Representative, 2016, p. 25) is
asserted throughout the EUGS. By combining continuity with some previous
cooperation templates and innovative approaches, the new EU foreign policy
reflects a hybrid perspective, which seeks to foster negotiation between exter-
nal and domestic actors. In this approach, resilience envisages the adaptation
of domestic structures based on external templates (as was the case under the
modernization paradigm previously used by the EU), but only under the con-
dition that they fit well with the local context. The focus is on state structures,
yet it is combined with unprecedented societal engagement. The EU’s
approach reflects a wider scope of resilience-building and a combination of
top-down and bottom-up logics of cooperation. In what follows, we assess
the congruence (or lack thereof) between the EU’s revised narrative and
policy practice under the EaP.
The resilience–local ownership nexus in practice
In this section, we scrutinize the evolution of the EU’s toolbox as part of the
EaP. We investigate whether the narrative turn away from the transition para-
digm and toward hybridity has translated into a change of policy practices. To
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do so, we select three sector areas for an in-depth analysis, namely trade and
economic development, mobility, and good governance and rule of law. These
sectors coincide with three of the four priorities identified during the Riga
summit, along which the EaP has been restructured since 2015 (Council of
the European Union, 2015; European Commission & High Representative,
2017b).
Trade and economic development
According to the EU, “building the economic resilience of EaP partner
countries is at the heart of the EU’s contribution towards having a stable
neighborhood” (EEAS, 2018). However, while economic resilience features
prominently in the EU’s narrative, practices of cooperation reflect a continu-
ous influence of the modernization theory in the EU’s understanding of resi-
lience. Since 2009, the EU’s core approach to trade and economic
development has been premised upon a massive diffusion of the EU’s own
set of rules, with limited attention to local needs. This is especially evident
in relations with Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, which remain shaped by
the trade instruments designed by the EU upon the launch of the EaP in
the late 2000s. Thus the EU’s narrative turn on resilience-building, in
2015–2016, has not been followed by a substantial shift in policy practice
with these countries.
As part of the EaP, the EU has offered deep economic integration to its
neighbors, that is enhanced market access by removing import and customs
duties and quantitative restrictions, and reducing technical barriers to trade.
The key instrument designed to foster economic integration—the Deep and
Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs) signed with Georgia, Moldova
and Ukraine—entails wholesale adoption and application of EU trade-
related standards. Interestingly, in the EU’s narrative DCFTAs are presented
as drivers for foreign investments and economic development in EaP
countries. This is because the EU expects its acquis to serve as a blueprint
for modernization:
They [the DCFTAs] will contain legally binding commitments on regulatory
approximation in trade-related areas and will thus contribute to the moderniz-
ation of the economies of the partner countries and anchor the necessary econ-
omic reforms. (European Commission, 2008, p. 5)
Importantly, the DCFTAs are expected to result in an improved business
climate and enhanced competitiveness of the EaP countries (Wolczuk et al.,
2017). Therefore, they have a major role to play in enhancing partner
countries’ economic resilience, even if only over time.
However, the DCFTAs reflect a subordination of local ownership to EU-
driven resilience-building. They mirror an extensive reliance on the EU’s
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model as a driver of development with the role of local actors being circum-
scribed to adopting reforms stemming from the agreements and ensuring an
effective application of EU rules. In fact, these agreements—whether in their
design, negotiations, substance or implementation mechanisms—leave little
scope for adjustment to EaP countries’ needs and contexts.
First, the EU’s economic offer moved from an initially flexible design in the
mid-2000s toward a take-it-or-leave-it approach as part of the EaP. This is
because the EU gradually established a connection between the DCFTAs
and its offer for an enhanced contractual framework in the form of Associ-
ation Agreements. Ultimately, the DCFTAs were identified as an “integral
part” of the Association Agreements (European Commission, 2008, p. 5).
This non-negotiable package strongly limited the options available to, and
constrained the choices of EaP countries. For instance, in the late 2000s the
Georgian authorities favored a simple free-trade agreement, which in their
views was more attuned to the country’s liberal reform trajectory as it did
not entail wholesale legal approximation (Delcour, 2017). However, ulti-
mately they had to accommodate the EU’s package deal, in light of the priority
given to an enhanced contractual framework with the EU after the 2008
conflict with Russia. Thus, the way in which the Association Agreements/
DCFTA package was pushed forward mirrors the imposition of a single EU
template for the partner countries, regardless of their specific trajectories
and preferences.
In the context of DCFTA negotiations, the EU’s imposition of its model
was facilitated by the use of ex-ante, sector-specific conditionality. The
tough experience of lengthy DCFTA negotiations with Ukraine in 2008–
2011 prompted the EU to introduce “key sectoral recommendations” in
core trade areas, such as sanitary and phyto-sanitary standards or technical
barriers to trade (Messerlin et al., 2011). These “recommendations,” which
entailed approximation with key EU legal acts in each area, had to be
fulfilled before negotiations for DCFTAs could be launched with Armenia,
Georgia, and Moldova. Therefore, considerable efforts were required
upfront from the EaP countries, with limited attention to their immediate
effects on domestic structures.
In terms of substance the Association Agreements/DCFTAs signed with
the EaP countries are the most comprehensive and detailed agreements con-
cluded with third countries. The three countries with a DCFTA have to
approximate their legal framework with over 90% of the EU’s trade-related
acquis (Duleba et al., 2012, p. 78). They are required to approximate to
both the acquis in force at the time of signing the Association Agreements
and to future legislation (Wolczuk et al., 2017). However, in essence the
acquis developed as common rules designed for EU member states. Its
export outside the context of EU integration and enlargement raises key ques-
tions in terms of its adaptation to partner countries’ needs (Delcour, 2017).
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This is especially salient in countries with both a lower level of socio-economic
development and weak institutions, as is the case in the EaP states (Wolczuk
et al., 2017). In other words, whether the EU’s “sophisticated post-financial
crisis legislation is the right medicine for Ukraine’s serious financial and econ-
omic crisis” is questionable (Van der Loo, 2016, p. 268). Thus the EU’s
capacity to trigger economic resilience in Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine is
debatable in light of the sheer gap with the partner countries and limited
adjustment to domestic contexts.
This focus on EU-driven resilience-building at the expense of local owner-
ship is only reinforced by the mechanisms envisaged to oversee the DCFTAs’
implementation. These mechanisms mirror a strict monitoring process
inspired by the enlargement toolbox. The associated countries have to
report on an annual basis on the measures taken to approximate their legal
framework with the acquis (see e.g., article 173.6, EU-Moldova Association
Agreement 2014). Therefore, “not only the process of legislative approxi-
mation but also—and most importantly—the effective enforcement and
implementation of the AA is subject to permanent scrutiny” (Van der Loo
et al, 2014, p. 27).
In sharp contrast to Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, the EU’s cooperation
with other EaP countries increasingly reflects a hybrid approach. The scope of
issue areas addressed by the EU to foster economic resilience is similarly
broad to that of DCFTA countries, e.g., support for small and medium enter-
prises and deepening of trade relations with the EU. However, the cooperation
mechanisms drastically differ. In recent years, the EU has designed a tailor-
made economic cooperation framework with Armenia (the Comprehensive
Enhanced Partnership Agreement [CEPA] signed in November 2017), and
it is in the process of doing so with Azerbaijan and Belarus (through the
current negotiation of EU–Belarus Partnership Priorities). All three frame-
works result from consensus-building between the EU and the respective
domestic authorities, and therefore reflect the countries’ specific contexts
rather than a single template.
It is important to note, however, that the EU’s hybrid approach vis-à-vis
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus stems from the partners themselves, more
specifically from their rejection (albeit for different reasons) of the EU’s
offer of deep economic integration. Despite the opening of negotiations in
2010, Azerbaijan refused to sign an Association Agreement and pushed
forward its own priorities in the negotiations for a Strategic Modernisation
Partnership (Alieva et al., 2017). At the 2015 Eastern Partnership summit
in Riga, the Azerbaijani authorities even submitted their own draft of the
future agreement to the EU as a basis for negotiations (Alieva et al., 2017,
21). In contrast to Azerbaijan, Armenia initially endorsed the EU’s deep econ-
omic integration offer, yet in September 2013, a few weeks after completing
the negotiations for an AA/DCFTA (including launching the corresponding
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reforms) the country moved (under Russia’s pressure) to join the Eurasian
Economic Union. This decision precluded the signature of a DCFTA and
called for designing a new trade cooperation framework tailored to the coun-
try’s specific circumstances (Alieva et al., 2017). Therefore, while they signal
greater local ownership and enhanced flexibility on the part of the EU com-
pared to the three DCFTA countries, cooperation frameworks with Armenia
and Azerbaijan do not derive from the EU’s narrative turn on resilience-build-
ing; in fact, they precede this turn.
Mobility
Mobility—one of the four priorities identified for the EaP in 2015—has a criti-
cal role to play in strengthening Eastern partners’ resilience. This is because it
“brings EU and Partner Countries’ societies closer together” (European Com-
mission & High Representative, 2017b). In other words, while bringing clear
benefits to the citizens of EaP countries mobility is also conducive to enhanced
capacities of societies to adapt and reform. This is because it can bring “posi-
tive spill-over effects” (Kobzova, 2015) in other areas, including economic
development, innovation and skills development (European Commission &
High Representative, 2017b). As part of the EaP, the EU offers two key instru-
ments to enhance mobility: first, the visa liberalization process aimed at elim-
inating the obligation of Schengen visas for EaP citizens, thereby enhancing
short-term mobility; and second, mobility partnerships, which were designed
to facilitate legal and circular mobility between the EU and its partners,
thereby fostering EaP countries’ development.
Unlike trade, the EU’s mobility toolbox is not premised upon the EU’s own
corpus of rules. Instead of anchoring Eastern partners’ reforms in the acquis
communautaire, the EU embeds policy change in a series of standards and
rules which either emanate from other international organizations or have
been developed gradually as ad hoc tools and are agreed upon with the
partner countries themselves (Hernández i Sagrera & Korneev, 2012). There-
fore, one would expect the EU’s mobility actions to mirror both an inclusive
policy process closely involving the partner countries in the discussion of
objectives and tailor-made instruments attuned to the needs of local societies.
However, closer scrutiny of how mobility has been operationalized in the EaP
highlights an asymmetrical policy process and top-down practices, with little
room for local actors.
As part of the EaP, visa policy follows a “phased approach, leading to visa
liberalization under specific conditions and with accompanying measures”
(European Commission, 2008, p. 6). Eastern partners are first expected to
sign visa facilitation and readmission agreements with the EU. While predat-
ing the EaP, these agreements have been incorporated in its toolbox as the first
milestone towards a visa-free regime. The EU indeed regards the effective
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implementation of the readmission agreements (a key policy tool to curb irre-
gular migration originating from, or transiting through, partner countries,
Trauner & Kruse, 2008) as a prerequisite to further progress towards the elim-
ination of Schengen visas. All six EaP countries have negotiated such agree-
ments, which have yet to be signed with Belarus. The next steps of the visa
liberalization process involve the launch of a visa dialogue with a view to
determining the conditions to be fulfilled to have the Schengen visa require-
ment lifted.
These conditions are then spelt out in the Visa Liberalization Action Plans
(VLAPs). They emphasize the need for Eastern partners to issue biometric
travel documents, to adopt and enact a legal framework complying with EU
standards on migration policy and border management, and to establish
high-standards border management procedures at their external borders.
They also include a broad set of demands related to human rights and the
rule of law, including procedures for asylum, the protection of personal data,
the fight against corruption and anti-discrimination. In order to ensure compli-
ance with its demands under the visa liberalization process, the EU extensively
relies upon conditionality and gate-keeping. For instance, in contrast to the visa
liberalization process with theWestern Balkans, VLAPs for Eastern Partners are
divided into two phases: an adoption phase, during which partner countries
have to approximate their legal framework with the EU’s requirements and
an implementation phase which requires approximated legislation to be prop-
erly enforced. For each phase, evaluation missions (involving experts from EU
Member States accompanied by officials of the Commission services and the
EEAS) are conducted to assess the fulfillment of benchmarks in all four
blocks. Subject to a positive recommendation by the European Commission,
the decision to introduce a visa-free regime should then be made by the
Council and the European Parliament. Thus far, the EU has lifted the obligation
of Schengen visas for Moldovan, Georgian, and Ukrainian citizens.
Such disciplinary governance reflects the EU’s perception of its neighbors
as a source of threats for its own security (Delcour, 2013). In the operationa-
lization of mobility, this perception has resulted in prioritizing security-
related measures. More specifically, the EU “has emphasized migration
control measures despite attempts to stress preventive elements in the EU’s
global approach to migration” (Wunderlich, 2012, p. 1421). When monitor-
ing the application of the readmission agreements, VLAPs and roadmaps,
scholars have demonstrated that the EU has given preference to security
and sidelined values (Trauner, Kruse & Zielinger, 2013). This prominence
reflects the EU’s key concern vis-à-vis neighboring countries, namely
“protect [its] internal security from outside threats” (Wolff, Mounier &Wich-
mann, 2009, p. 12). In other words, as part of the visa liberalization process
the EU has sought to build neighbors’ resilience to what it regarded as
dangers (i.e., irregular migration) that could spill-over to its own territory.
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In contrast to trade, all six neighbors are engaged in the EU-defined path
to visa facilitation and liberalization, even though at a different pace. This is
despite the fact that the EU’s regulatory approach to migration collided with
the preferences of some EaP countries. Georgia, in particular, has consist-
ently pursued a liberal approach to migration since 2004. In the wake of
the Rose revolution, migration came to be seen as a pillar of the authorities’
economic strategy, which primarily sought to attract foreign investment and
to create a favorable business environment (Delcour, 2017). In other words,
migration was regarded as an integral part of the country’s resilience-build-
ing efforts. Yet as a result of the EU’s extensive conditionality under the
VLAP the country had little choice but shifting toward a stricter regulation
of migration flows–an approach which, in the local view, would be
detrimental to the country’s resilience-building. This example indicates
that the EU has done little to incorporate the partner countries’ own objec-
tives in the visa liberalization process, which may ultimately undermine
consensus and local ownership. Importantly, it also sheds light on
different understandings of resilience, which result from the divergence of
goals between the EU and the partner countries. Ultimately, the EU’s impo-
sition of its approach to mobility and migration undermines EaP countries’
resilience as the emphasis on security results in limiting mobility, despite
the fact that the latter was identified as a vector of resilience-building by
the EU itself.
Good governance and rule of law
The EU’s strategy towards the EaP is premised on the idea that “a resilient
state is a secure state, and security is key for prosperity and democracy. But
the reverse holds true as well” (High Representative, 2016, pp. 23–24). The
question of democratic regime resilience therefore becomes an existential
issue. According to the EU, to be resilient, a state must be characterized by
deep democracy and strong governance. Hence, enhancing the EaP states’
resilience implies strengthening domestic institutions, the rule of law and
anti-corruption mechanisms, as well as judicial and public administration
reforms (EEAS, 2018). Whereas such vision of resilience presents a strong
continuity with the previous modernization approach, the EU encountered
two types of responses from its partners. Some EaP member states shared
this paradigm and welcomed EU-modeled domestic reforms. Substantial
support for such reforms by both domestic political elites and population at
large ensured a considerable degree of local ownership in the Association
Agreement states (Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine) and, partially, Armenia.
Other EaP members (Azerbaijan and Belarus) rejected this approach to resi-
lience, and the EU had to adjust its cooperation agenda. Yet, to what extent
has it resulted in change of practices and greater local ownership?
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Closer analysis of the EU’s vision of resilience in the context of governance
and the rule of law demonstrates that in the case of the Association Agree-
ment states modernization theory remains almost unchanged, for instance,
for Georgia resilience is framed as maintenance of the democratic reforms
conducted in the presidency of Saakashvili. In the case of Ukraine, resilience
is understood as keeping up the momentum of the Euromaidan and the pace
of reforms, as well as internalizing the ongoing institutional reforms. In
Moldova, similarly, resilience is about substantiating the reforms conducted
and countervailing illiberal practices (Emerson et al., 2018, pp. 90–91; see
also Gaub & Popescu, 2017). The Association Agreements (as well as the
CEPA in the case of Armenia) are the main instruments for enhancing
these reforms. An important innovation compared to the previous generation
of framework agreements (PCAs) is that human rights are included in “dia-
logue and cooperation on domestic reform” provisions. In addition to that,
the “essential elements” clause (referring to human rights, fundamental free-
doms and the rule of law) is linked to the “suspension” clause (Petrov, 2018;
Khvorostiankina, 2018). This facilitates deep entrenchment of democratic and
rule of law principles in the Association Agreements and CEPA, and demon-
strates that principles of good governance are at the heart of bilateral
cooperation. Association Agreements are therefore set to facilitate consti-
tutional changes that aim at approximation to the EU’s liberal democratic
norms and values.
Based on these normative commitments, after 2015–2016 the EU contin-
ued the previously established practice obliging the Association Agreement
states to put in place a standard package of domestic reforms (public admin-
istration, anti-corruption, rule of law, justice sector reforms, and others). The
EU also ensured that domestic reforms are developed in line with the EU’s
norms and principles (including the standard recommendations by the
Council of Europe and OECD, in particular GRECO and SIGMA), comprise
standard benchmarks and are based on the single design and implementation
template. Thus, whereas Association Agendas and roadmaps were drafted
together by the EU and the respective EaP ministries, the EU remained in
control of the bilateral agenda, setting tight limits on the negotiation corridor
and pushing its view on the design of reforms. In Ukraine, for instance,
despite active internal debates and resistance, “the EU Delegation pressed
for the urgent establishment of the three new anti-corruption institutions:
The National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine; the National Agency for
the Prevention of Corruption; and the specialized anti-corruption prosecutor”
(European Commission, 2016, p. 7).
Yet, beyond agenda-setting, the EU has also remained active at the stages of
reforms’ implementation and evaluation. It provided consultation, expert and
financial support, training and technical assistance and in some cases drafted
reform programs. It also carried out close oversight of the reform process,
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foreseeing the application of conditionality in case of non-compliance. As
such, the EU’s approach resulted in limiting local ownership at all stages of
policy cycle.
On the other hand, the case of Azerbaijan and Belarus is particularly
illustrative for the analysis of whether the EU’s narrative change resulted in
subsequent practices change, as cooperation with these states implied devi-
ation from the standard enlargement logic of cooperation. These states prior-
itized their own understanding of good governance and resilience. They opted
for a lower level of engagement and have regularly asked for a more equal
status and greater local ownership in bilateral relations. Hence, the EU has
faced two challenges: firstly, to develop a format for cooperation that would
be based on genuinely common agenda, and therefore, allow for the requested
level of local ownership; secondly, to develop a cooperation format that would
enhance societal resilience, and at the same time not strengthen autocratic
regimes resilience.
Both Azerbaijan and Belarus prioritize a pragmatic approach to economic
and sectoral cooperation, while trying to scale down the EU’s strategy of pol-
itical norms promotion. The 2015–2016 ENP revision emphasizing policy
differentiation acknowledged that partner’s preferences will be instrumental
in the new format of bilateral cooperation. Given that Azerbaijan and
Belarus perceive the EU-modeled good governance reforms as an interference
into their domestic affairs, anti-corruption, public administration and judicial
reforms moved to the bottom of the bilateral agenda. Nevertheless, the EU still
demanded approximation with the European standards: “tangible steps taken
by Belarus to respect universal fundamental freedoms, rule of law and human
rights will remain key for the shaping of the EU’s future policy towards
Belarus” (Council of the European Union, 2016). Thus the early assessments
of the good governance agenda show that the essence of the EU’s new “tailor-
made” approach entails offering the same package of policy templates to its
partners and allowing them to opt out from some, rather than actually includ-
ing partners in the agenda-setting process (van Gils, 2017). This, however,
ultimately limits the potential of local ownership and resilience as understood
by the hybrid and communitarian paradigms.
Next to the state level, the EU regards good governance and rule of law as
important elements of societal resilience. The revised strategy therefore sought
to facilitate greater societal ownership of the cooperation agenda and rule of
law reforms. To this end, the EU managed to ensure greater engagement of
civil society into bilateral cooperation, for instance Association Agreements
and CEPA established a new format of “Civil Society Platform,” adding a
bilateral track to the already existing multilateral EaP Civil Society Forum
(CSF). Next to the EaP CSF, national indicative programs allocated 5–10
percent of financial aid to the support of national CSOs and improving
their environment. Building on previous ad hoc practices, another novelty
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in the EU’s approach includes an attempt to more actively engage civil society
representatives in bilateral cooperation, as well as facilitate dialogue between
governments and CSOs.
Overall, the EU’s policy in the area of good governance and rule of law in
the EaP region is still guided by the modernization vision of resilience. The
EU’s norms and practices are seen as universal and approximation to EU
standards is still expected even from Belarus and Azerbaijan, who opted
out from the Association Agreement policy template. Such an approach is
likely to result in limited local ownership, and as a consequence, direct, and
more often, indirect resistance to the EU’s promotion of good governance
and rule of law in the EaP states, which can undermine the EU’s resilience-
building in the eastern neighborhood.
Conclusion
This article departed from the observation that the EaP, as a core priority
region for the EU, offers fertile ground to assess the recent resilience turn
in EU foreign policy. Attempts at resilience-building beyond the EU’s
borders imply an increasing focus on the adaptability of the EaP domestic
structures and their ability to withstand internal and external crises. As
such, the resilience turn was supposed to shift responsibility from the EU
to the EaP states, hence, heavily increasing local ownership.
Our analysis of the EU foreign policy documents shows that policy revision
resulted in an important narrative turn. Whereas since its launch in 2009, the
Eastern Partnership policy had been largely based on the premises of modern-
ization theory, implying wholesale and unilateral approximation to the EU
legislation, institutions, and practices, the 2015 ENP review marked a discur-
sive turn towards a hybrid approach. This approach implies opening up the
political process of broad negotiation and contestation with a view to building
a genuinely owned common cooperation agenda. In line with the hybrid
approach thinking, the EU policy review stresses: (i) in terms of mechanisms:
tailor-made cooperation agenda, differentiation and “different paths” to
enhancing resilience; (ii) in terms of actors: wide societal engagement at all
stages of policy-making in addition to the executive level; (iii) in terms of
scope: a wide and demand-driven scope of resilience, including resilience of
state, society, institutions, and policies.
However, our analysis of the EU practices of cooperation with EaP
countries in the priority areas of trade, mobility, and good governance
demonstrates that the narrative turn has, so far, failed to translate into an
actual policy turn. In fact, the EU’s broad conceptualization of resilience
and local ownership has resulted in a narrow operationalization in terms
of policy instruments. Hence, our analysis shows that the EU continued
to rely on previously established policy templates and mechanisms, as
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illustrated by the requirement to approximate to acquis communautaire, as
well as the EU’s mobility and good governance legislation. This shows that,
according to the EU’s approach, the resilience of the EaP states can only be
developed via the adoption of the EU’s standards. Despite the promise of a
tailor-made approach, the cases of Azerbaijan and Belarus are particularly
illustrative of the fact that, albeit on the smaller scale, approximation with
European standards is still expected even from those partners that insisted
on building a truly common bilateral agenda. We argue that the strong
path dependence of the EaP policy precluded any effective policy turn
towards the hybrid approach to resilience (for similar conclusions, see
Joseph & Juncos, 2019).
Our findings invalidate the assumption formulated in the introduction,
according to which policy areas beyond the security/humanitarian context
may offer an easier ground for translating local ownership from policy prin-
ciple to policy practice. All three cases show that the EU has left little scope
(if any) to accommodate the preferences of those countries seeking closer
ties with the EU, when these preferences diverged from its own vision.
This continued reliance on the modernization paradigm in resilience-build-
ing left little space for increasing local ownership and precluded any
significant political contestation and subsequent consensus-building. The
2015–2016 policy review still embraces the practices of local ownership
where the role of “the local” is reduced to the demonstration of interest in
cooperation and subsequent implementation of externally developed
policy templates.
The application of the resilience and local ownership principles as under-
stood by the modernization theory has had important consequences for their
interplay. The belief that resilience can only be assured by approximation
towards the Western structures has resulted in limiting local ownership. Such
a nexus between resilience and local ownership entails a logic of subordination
of the domestic to the international actors, despite a narrative emphasizing
partnership, ownership and dialogue. Hence, our article confirms the vision
of the EU’s resilience-building in the neighborhood as a form of neoliberal gov-
ernmentality (Joseph, 2013; Pogodda & Richmond 2015; Ejdus & Juncos, 2018),
aiming at an effective governance of the EaP countries, rather than genuine
empowerment of the local, taking their vision of good life as the foundation
of the cooperation agenda (Korosteleva & Flockhart, 2020). This conclusion
is in line with existing studies in peacebuilding arguing that by shifting respon-
sibility and accountability to the partners, local ownership and resilience are
used in the official rhetoric to legitimize interventions by external actors
(Wilen, 2009). Hence, despite a discursive shift towards hybridity–forced by
multiple crises and the EU’s challenged international role in the emergent
multi-order world (Flockhart, 2016)—a substantial overhaul of policy practices
is still required to match the narrative turn.
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Notes
1. The official documents use the terms “local ownership,” “joint ownership,” and
“mutual ownership” interchangeably referring to the same concept. In this
article, we use the term “local ownership” as it is more common in the academic
literature.
2. For more discussion on this, please see Korosteleva (2020) and Chandler (2020)
in this special issue.
3. This argument is developed in-depth in Korosteleva’s article (2020) in this
special issue.
4. After the European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker proposed the
revision of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2014, a range of consul-
tations with the stakeholders from the EU and partner states were conducted
to reflect on the previous policy cycle of the ENP, its institutions, resources,
and lessons learned.
Acknowledgments
We thank Elena Korosteleva, Trine Flockhart, and two anonymous reviewers for their
comments on earlier drafts of this article.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Funding
This research was supported by the GCRF UKRI COMPASS project (ES/P010849/1).
Notes on contributors
Irina Petrova is a researcher at the Leuven International and European Studies
(LINES) Institute at KU Leuven and a research associate at the GCRF COMPASS
project, University of Kent. Her research concentrates on comparative analysis of
the EU and Russia’s foreign policy strategies and their perceptions in the Eastern Part-
nership states. Previously Irina worked as a teaching assistant at the European Studies
master program at KU Leuven and an adjunct lecturer at Vesalius College, Brussels.
She was a research assistant for the H2020 UPTAKE project and Jean Monnet
Network “C3EU: Crisis, Conflict and Critical Diplomacy: EU Perceptions in
Ukraine, Israel and Palestine,” led by the University of Christchurch, New Zealand.
Laure Delcour is an Associate Professor in European Studies and International
Relations, Université Paris 3-Sorbonne nouvelle. She is also a Visiting Professor at
the College of Europe in Bruges. She has been involved in EU-funded projects on
the ENP/Eastern Partnership, both as a researcher under the H2020 project EU-
STRAT and as a scientific coordinator of the FP7 project “Exploring the Security-
Democracy Nexus in the Caucasus” (CASCADE, FMSH, Paris). As part of a
French–British research project (EUIMPACTEAST, ANR-ESRC, 2011–2014), she
has investigated the EU’s influence on domestic change in four post-Soviet countries
CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY 355
(Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine). She has lectured on EU institutions and
decision-making, the European Neighbourhood Policy, EU-Russia relations, and
Russia’s foreign policy (Sciences-Po Paris; Sciences-Po Strasbourg; Moscow State





Alieva, L., Delcour, L. and Kostanyan, H. (2017). EU relations with Armenia and
Azerbaijan, study for the European Parliament. AFET Committee, Brussels.
Retrieved from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/133502/EU20relations20
with20Armenia20and%20Azerbaijan.pdf
Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic
Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic
of Moldova, of the other part (2014, August 30). Official Journal of the European
Union L260/4. Retrieved from https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/ALL/?
uri=uriserv%3AOJ.L_.2014.260.01.0004.01.ENG
Bell, D. (2016). Communitarianism. Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. Retrieved
from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/communitarianism/
Brown, C. (1992). International relations theory: New normative approaches.
New York, NY: Harvester-Wheatsheaf.
Bush, K. (1996). Beyond bungee cord humanitarianism: Towards a developmental
agenda for peacebuilding. Canadian Journal of Development Studies, 1(1), 75–92.
Council of the European Union (2003, December 12). European Security Strategy. A
Secure Europe in a better world. Retrieved from https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=LEGISSUM:r00004&from=EN
Council of the European Union (2015). Joint Declaration of the Riga Eastern
Partnership Summit, 21–22 May. Retrieved from https://www.consilium.europa.
eu/media/21526/riga-declaration-220515-final.pdf
Council of the European Union (2016, February 15). Council conclusions on Belarus.
Retrieved from https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/02/
15/fac-belarus-conclusions/pdf
Chandler, D. (2014). Beyond neoliberalism: Resilience, the new art of governing com-
plexity. Resilience, 2, 47–63. doi:10.1080/21693293.2013.878544
Chandler,D. (2020). Security through societal resilience: Contemporary challenges in the
Anthropocene. Contemporary Security Policy, 41(2), 195–214. doi:10.1080/13523260.
2019.1659574
Davis Cross, M. (2016). The EU global strategy and diplomacy. Contemporary
Security Policy, 37, 402–413. doi:10.1080/13523260.2016.1237820
Delcour, L. (2013). The European Union: Shaping migration patterns in the neigh-
bourhood… .and beyond? In F. Amtenbrink, & D. Kochenov (Eds.), European
Union’s shaping of the legal international order (pp. 261–281). Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Delcour, L. (2017). The EU and Russia in their ‘contested neighbourhood’: Multiple
external influences, policy transfer and domestic change. Abingdon: Routledge.
356 I. PETROVA AND L. DELCOUR
Donais, T. (2012). Peacebuilding and local ownership: Post-conflict consensus-building.
Abingdon: Routledge.
Duffield, M. R. (2001). Global governance and the new wars: The merging of develop-
ment and security. New York, NY: Zed.
Duffield, M. R. (2007). Development, security and unending war: Governing the world
of peoples. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Duleba, A., Ben, V., & Bilčík, V. (2012). Policy impact of the Eastern Partnership on
Ukraine: Trade, energy, and visa dialogue. Bratislava: Research Centre of the
Slovak Foreign Policy Association.
Ejdus, F. (2017). “Here is your mission, now own it!” The rhetoric and practice of local
ownership in EU interventions. European Security, 26, 461–484. doi:10.1080/
09662839.2017.1333495
Ejdus, F., & Juncos, A. (2018). Reclaiming the local in EU peacebuilding: Effectiveness,
ownership, and resistance. Contemporary Security Policy, 39, 4–27. doi:10.1080/
13523260.2017.1407176
Emerson, M., Cenusa, D., Kovziridze, T., & Movchan, A. (2018). The struggle for good
governance in Eastern Europe. Brussels: CEPS.
European Commission. (2004, May 12). European neighbourhood policy. Strategy paper.
Communication from the Commission. COM(2004) 373 final. Brussels: Author.
European Commission. (2008, December 3). Eastern Partnership. Communication to the
European Parliament and to the Council. COM (2008) 823 final. Brussels: Author.
European Commission. (2012, December 3). The EU’s approach to resilience: Learning
from food security crises. Communication to the European Parliament and the
Council COM (2012) 586 final. Brussels: Author.
European Commission. (2016). Support Group for Ukraine: Activity report. Brussels:
Author.
European Commission & High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy. (2015, November 11). Joint communication to the European
Parliament, the Council, the European economic and social Committee and the
Committee of the regions: Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy SWD
(2015) 500 final JOIN (2015) 50 final. Brussels: Author.
European Commission & High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy. (2017a, June 7). A strategic approach to resilience in the EU’s exter-
nal action communication to the European Parliament and the Council JOIN (2017)
21 final. Brussels: Author.
European Commission & High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy. (2017b, June 9). Eastern Partnership - 20 Deliverables for 2020
focusing on key priorities and tangible results, Joint Staff Working Document
SWD(2017) 300 final. Brussels: Author.
European External Action Service (2018). Eastern partnership 20 deliverables for
2020: State of play in 2018, Brussels. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/
neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/eap_deliverables_factsheet_2018.pdf
Flockhart, T. (2016). The coming multi-order world. Contemporary Security Policy,
37, 3–30. doi:10.1080/13523260.2016.1150053
Joseph, J. (2013). Resilience as embedded neoliberalism: A governmentality approach.
Resilience, 1, 38–52. doi:10.1080/21693293.2013.765741
Joseph, J., & Juncos, A. (2019). Resilience as an emergent European project? The EU’s
place in the resilience turn. Journal of Common Market Studies, 57, 995–1012.
doi:10.1111/jcms.12881
CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY 357
Juncos, A. (2017). Resilience as the new EU foreign policy paradigm: A pragmatist
turn? European Security, 26, 1–18. doi:10.1080/09662839.2016.1247809
Gaub, F., & Popescu, N. (2017). After the EU global strategy: Building resilience. Paris:
EU-ISS.
Goorha, P. (2010). Modernization theory. Oxford Research Encyclopedia of
International Studies, doi:10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.266
Hernández i Sagrera, R., & Korneev, O. (2012). Bringing EU migration cooperation to
the Eastern neighbourhood: Convergence beyond the acquis communautaire? RSCAS
Working Paper, 22. Florence: European University Institute.
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (2016).
Shared vision, common action: A stronger Europe. A global strategy for the EU’s
foreign and security policy. Retrieved from http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/
top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf
Khvorostiankina, O. (2018). Europeanization through EU external agreements and
the issue of “constitutional Identity”: The case of the EU-Armenia CEPA. Kyiv-
Mohyla Law and Politics Journal, 4, 15–52.
Kobzova, J. (2015). Eastern partnership after Riga: Rethink, reforms, resilience. ECFR
Riga Series. European Council on Foreign Relations.
Korosteleva, E. (2018). Paradigmatic or critical? Resilience as a New Turn in EU
Governance for the Neighbourhood. Journal of International Relations and
Development, 21, 1–19. doi:10.1057/s41268-018-0155-z
Korosteleva, E. (2020). Reclaiming resilience back: A local turn in EU external govern-
ance. Contemporary Security Policy, 41(2), 241–262. doi:10.1080/13523260.2019.
1685316
Korosteleva, E., & Flockhart, T. (2020). Resilience in EU and international insti-
tutions: Redefining local ownership in a new global governance agenda.
Contemporary Security Policy, 41(2), 153–175. doi:10.1080/13523260.2020.1723973
Lavenex, S. (2004). EU external governance in ‘wider Europe’? Journal of European
Public Policy, 11, 680–700. doi:10.1080/1350176042000248098
Leonardsson, H., & Rudd, G. (2015). The ‘local turn’ in peacebuilding: A literature
review of effective and emancipatory local peacebuilding. Third World Quarterly,
36, 825–839. doi:10.1080/01436597.2015.1029905
Mac Ginty, R. (2010). Hybrid peace: The interaction between top-down and bottom-
up peace. Security Dialogue, 41, 391–412.
Mac Ginty, R., & Sanghera, G. (2012). Hybridity in peacebuilding and development:
An introduction. Journal of Peacebuilding & Development, 7(2), 3–8. doi:10.1080/
15423166.2012.742800
Mac Ginty, R., & & Richmond, O. (2013). The local turn in peace building: A critical
agenda for peace. Third World Quarterly, 34, 763–783. doi:10.1080/01436597.2013.
800750
Mahr, E. (2018). Local contestation against the European Union Rule of Law Mission
in Kosovo. Contemporary Security Policy, 39, 72–94. doi:10.1080/13523260.2017.
1407060
Mälksoo, M. (2016). From the ESS to the EU Global Strategy: External policy, internal
purpose. Contemporary Security Policy, 37, 374–388. doi:10.1080/13523260.2016.
1238245
Messerlin, P., Emerson,M., Jandieri, G., & Le Vernoy, A. (2011).AnAppraisal of the EU’s
trade policy toward its Eastern Neighbours: The case of Georgia. Brussels: CEPS.
Nathan, L. (2007). No ownership, no commitment: A guide to local ownership of secur-
ity sector reform. Birmingham: University of Birmingham Press.
358 I. PETROVA AND L. DELCOUR
Paris, R. (2010). Saving liberal peacebuilding. Review of International Studies, 36, 337–
365. doi:10.1017/S0260210510000057
Petrov, R. (2018). EU common values in the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement:
Anchor to democracy? Baltic Journal of Euroepan Studies, 8, 49–62. doi:10.1515/
bjes-2018-0004
Peterson, J. (2012). A conceptual unpacking of hybridity: Accounting for notions of
power, politics and progress in analyses of aid-driven interfaces. Journal of
Peacebuilding & Development, 7(2), 9–22.
Pogodda, S., & Richmond, O. (2015). Palestinian unity and everyday state formation:
Subaltern ‘ungovernmentality’ versus elite interests. Third World Quarterly, 36,
890–907. doi:10.1080/01436597.2015.1029909
Richmond, O. (2012). Beyond local ownership in the architecture of inter-
national peace-building. Ethnopolitics, 11, 354–375. doi:10.1080/17449057.
2012.697650
Sabaratnam, M. (2013). Avatars of Eurocentrism in the critique of the liberal peace.
Security Dialogue, 44, 259–278. doi:10.1177/0967010613485870
Selby, J. (2013). The myth of liberal peace-building. Conflict, Security & Development,
13, 57–86. doi:10.1080/14678802.2013.770259
Smith, M. E. (2016). Implementing the global strategy where it matters most: The
EU’s credibility deficit and the European neighbourhood. Contemporary Security
Policy, 37, 446–460. doi:10.1080/13523260.2016.1240467
Tocci, N. (2017). Framing the EU global strategy: A stronger Europe in a fragile world.
London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Tocci, N. (2020). Resilience and the role of the European Union in the world.
Contemporary Security Policy, 41(2), 176–194. doi:10.1080/13523260.2019.
1640342
Trauner, F., & Kruse, I. (2008). EC visa facilitation and readmission agreements:
Implementing a new EU security approach in the neighbourhood. CEPS Working
Document, 290. Brussels: CEPS.
Trauner, F., Kruse, I., & Zielinger, B. (2013). Values versus security in the external
dimension of the EU migration policy: A case study on the EC readmission
Agreement with Russia. In G. Noutcheva, G. Bosse, & K. Pomorska (Eds.),
Values versus security? The choice for the EU and its neighbours (pp. 201–217).
Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Van der Loo, G. (2016). The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement and deep comprehen-
sive free trade area. The Hague: Brill/Nijhoff.
Van der Loo, G., Van Elsuwege, P., & Petrov, R. (2014). The EU-Ukraine Association
Agreement: Assessment of an innovative legal instrument. EUI Working Papers Law
2014/09. Florence: EUI.
Van Gils, E. (2017). Differentiation through bargaining power in EU–Azerbaijan
relations: Baku as a tough negotiator. East European Politics, 33, 388–405. doi:10.
1080/21599165.2017.1322957
Wagner, W., & Anholt, R. (2016). Resilience as the EU global strategy’s new leitmotif:
Pragmatic, problematic or promising? Contemporary Security Policy, 37, 414–430.
doi:10.1080/13523260.2016.1228034
Wilen, N. (2009). Capacity-building or capacity-taking? Legitimizing concepts in
peace and development Operations. International Peacekeeping, 16, 337–351.
doi:10.1080/13533310903036392
Wolczuk, K., Delcour, L., Dragneva, R., Maniokas, K., & Zeruolis, D. (2017). The
Association agreements as a Dynamic framework: Between modernization and
CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY 359
integration. EU-STRAT working paper, 6. Berlin: Freie Universität. Retrieved from
http://eu-strat.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/EU-STRAT-Working-Paper-No.-6.
pdf.
Wolff, S., Mounier, G., & Wichmann, N. (2009). The external dimension of justice
and home affairs: A different security agenda for the EU? Journal for European
Integration, 31, 9–23. doi:10.1080/07036330802503817
Wunderlich, D. (2012). The limits of external governance: Implementing EU external
migration policy. Journal of European Public Policy, 19, 1414–1433. doi:10.1080/
13501763.2012.672106
Zaum, D. (2012). Beyond the “liberal peace”. Global Governance, 18, 121–132. doi:10.
1163/19426720-01801010
360 I. PETROVA AND L. DELCOUR
